

reserve battalion. The practical result of this change is that the W/T personnel of a KdM or PAK are now members of a central specialized unit which posts and equips them instead of leaving such matters to the initiative of individual stations.

c. Central control of sabotage and subversive actions.

It is now clear that Milant D, the successor of Abwehr Gruppe II, the II FrontaufklaerungsTrupps and Kommandos and TTS of the RSHA are under the same management, that of Otto SKORZENY. Though they may each have their specialists, SKORZENY appears to intend to organize their work in much closer co-operation. His policy is no less a personal one than that of HIMMLER himself. His appointment by HIMMLER to take charge of all sabotage and subversive measures, together with the increasing subservience of the OKW to control by Hitler's Party nominees, has made it possible for him to bring within his empire not only Milant D, but the II Frontaufklaerung-Kommandos nominally directed by the OKW. At the moment his activities appear to be directed against the Allied troops in territories bordering upon the Reich, but it seems likely that as the Allies advance, he may by virtue of experience and position, become the director of similar work by the German resistance. Of this there is as yet no clear evidence. In the account which follows it should be remembered that much still remains unknown and that the chronology of events, not easy at the best of times, changes daily as fresh information comes in. In particular the relations and duties of Jagdverbaende, 502 Jaeger Battalion and the SS Sonderkommandos (cf pages 3-4) are still extremely obscure.

SKORZENY is of interest in himself as a wonderfully typical Nazi product. Born in VIENNA in June 1908, he spent his youth in the same city, attending in due order the Realschule and the Technische Hochschule. In December 1931 he took an engineering diploma and from that date until shortly before the war was works manager in the motor building trade. From his schooldays he is reported to have interested himself in the more militant sort of nationalist activities, joining in turn the Studentenfreikorps, the Steirischen Heimatschutz, the Nazi Party (May 1932), and the Allgemeine-SS (February 1934). He seems to have played an energetic if not very responsible part in the illegal Nazi plotting in Austria which led to the Anschluss of March 1938. On the day itself he commanded an SS motorized unit. In January 1940 he volunteered for service in the Waffen-SS and became an Obersturmfuehrer in the SS Reich Division, in which he saw active service in the West, in the Balkans and on the Russian front. We know nothing of his performance in these theatres, except that he enjoyed a reputation for personal bravery and, according to one source, did a short spell in Dachau Concentration Camp. He was subsequently transferred to the SD as a Hauptsturmfuehrer.

His first known appearance as an SD officer was early in 1943, when he was engaged in recruiting and training a unit of his own for a special operation. This unit undertook several minor missions before it was finally entrusted, in September 1943, with the task of rescuing MUSSOLINI from Allied hands. The successful accomplishment of this task not only placed SKORZENY and his men "on the map" (he was decorated and promoted to Sturm-bannfuehrer), but also gave proof of what the RSHA could do in the matter of carrying out special assignments of a quasi-military nature.

From this point onward the story becomes rather more complicated. HIMMLER, already no doubt planning the overthrow of the Abwehr/

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the Abwehr and of its special pet, the Brandenburg Division, gave increasing responsibility to SKORZENY, who developed rapidly and in several directions the basic idea of special task-forces under RSHA control.

Shortly after the MUSSOLINI venture, SKORZENY (now an Obersturmbannführer) was busy in Amt VI of the RSHA where, as head of Referat VI S (the creation of which dated back to August 1943) he organized a series of missions, partly sabotage and partly subversive, the significance of which was bound to grow as German forces fell back upon Reich territory. Among these may be mentioned a Baltic undertaking involving sabotage operations in Latvia and Lithuania, and a more ambitious plan for the Balkans, where two Sonderkommandos are known to have been commissioned to operate on Greek soil in the rear of the Allied advance. A special feature - and not only in Greece - has been the close and natural co-operation between VI S and VI F, the latter providing the technical equipment and personnel essential to such ventures. A second feature worthy of comment has been the reported independence of the Balkan Sonderkommandos from the stay-behind network of VI E (the territorial Referat of Amt VI responsible for espionage in that area). SKORZENY is clearly not involved in straightforward espionage.

Developing side by side with the VI S Sonderkommandos has appeared another child of SKORZENY's, the SS Jaeger Battalion 502. On the date of origin of this battalion there is some dispute. A recent source has stated that as early as December 1943, Schloss Friedenthal, near Oranienburg, was the HQ of the battalion, and that from it an abortive expedition to French territory was organized. Prior to this, we had supposed that the Battalion had been set up in the summer of 1944. Jaeger Battalion 502 must be distinguished from SS Jaeger Battalions 500 and 501, both of which have been reported to be regular SS militia formations for use in anti-guerrilla operations. Their training, which has been notably poor, has taken place at MOORLIGER in Poland. It is not now believed that they have ever formed part of SKORZENY's command, which is limited to Jaeger Battalions 502 and - though it may well have been dissolved - 202.

In June of this year, Jaeger Battalion 502 was earmarked for an "all-out operation", which in fact never materialized. For it, volunteers were required from my arm of the service, and a sense of some urgency was apparent. Both then and later it has seemed that 502 Battalion was reserved for Germans - a distinction which is of some interest in view of recent developments. There has, however, been a case of two Belgians (both German speakers) being trained at PAPA in Hungary for an operation with the Battalion. They speak of the Battalion as Fallschirmjaegerbattalion 502, but it is thought that the addition on their part may only have been due to the impression made upon immature minds by the parachute-training that forms part of the training. The Battalion, whether parachute or otherwise, must probably be distinguished from the SS Fallschirmjaeger Battalion which made one or more raids on Tito's headquarters, and which, at the time of these operations at least, did not come under SKORZENY's command.

In the course of this summer, SKORZENY became head of Militaerisches Amt D, the new control centre for Abwehr II undertakings. It seems plain that he has not sought to swamp or even to reduce the latter's role, but merely to concentrate it upon those tasks which best suit it and which do not clash with SS undertakings (i.e. exploitation of disaffected groups and the fomenting of subversion behind Allied lines). SKORZENY's interest in what looked like Abwehr II matters (notably in Yugoslavia and Italy) had

been known/

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been known for some time but it was not until quite recently that evidence occurred from the Western Front of a sabotage operation undertaken by MEK 700 in which the SS and SKORZENY in particular, were clearly involved. The combination of SS with Abwehr personnel on special missions has its own disadvantages, one of which is that the two services are a little jealous of their own records and efficiency. How far the under-water sabotage undertaken by KDK is controlled by SKORZENY we do not know; but his hand is in evidence here also. We are promised large-scale sabotage in the Low Countries, which, whether undertaken by Abwehr or SS units, in unison or independently, will ultimately be supervised by SKORZENY as head of Mil. Amt D, as O.C. of Jaeger Battalion 502 and as Leiter of Amt VI 8.

SKORZENY has one further iron in the fire. He has for some time been credited with building up a unit or units on the Brandenburg model, designed to supplement the work of Abwehr II. These units are independent of Jaeger Battalion 502. They have now emerged as Jagdverbaende and Stoerverbaende (Harassing Units) with their headquarters in Friedenthal, and are officially reported to have taken over the tasks of the Brandenburg Division, which reverts to a military role. (Lehrregiment KURFUEURST alone remains as the Mil. Amt holding and training unit). In order to carry out these tasks, and especially the direction of foreign resistance movements, they have been ordered to collaborate closely with all military and civil authorities. Their creation, and the fact that their functions are not unlike those of the Frontaufklarungskommandos and Trupps, have necessitated the creation of local co-ordinators (known as Area Commissioners), each a miniature SKORZENY in his own area. The Area Commissioner for the Baltic co-ordinates the work of the Jagdverbaende (directly) and of the Frontaufklarungskommandos (indirectly, through Leitstelle Ost), from a central Befehlstelle. There is no doubt that similar Befehlstellen will be identified elsewhere; there is already good reason to think that they may exist in the Balkans, on the Western Front and possibly in Northern Italy. We may notice in passing that both the Area Commissioners and the officers commanding Jagdverbaende are alleged to hold special identity papers proving their connection with this type of work.

It is not yet possible to distinguish between the functions of Jaeger Battalion 502 and those of the Jagdverbaende; both are concerned with resistance activities involving sabotage and partisan subversion. It may be said in general terms that the latter, unlike the former, specialize in the employment of foreigners and of personnel with language qualifications. Early in October, SKORZENY received permission from the SS Hauptamt to recruit Volksdeutsche from the SS Training Camp at SENNHEIM for future special operations. They were to be sent to FRIEDENTHAL for training. These operations - and probably much of the more recent SKORZENY recruiting activity - are perhaps more likely to involve the Jagdverbaende than the Jaeger Battalion. It would not be surprising if SKORZENY's "JEUNE" organization, now known to be operating on sabotage missions with the Faux Maquis in France, were controlled by Jagdverbaende; but evidence is lacking. Some of its personnel, at least, were trained at FRIEDENTHAL.

D. Brandenburg Division. (cf. para.C)

After the dissolution of the Abwehr the Brandenburg Division, which from the beginning had always been closely associated with Abwehr II, passed under the control of the Wehrmachtfuehrungstab of the OKW. At about the same time the fifth Lehrregiment of the Division was placed under direct orders

of Abwehr II/

of Abwehr II, and subsequently of Mil Amt D, and was renamed the Lehrregiment KURFUERST. It has since then acted as a general training centre for the Militaerisches Amt.

At the beginning of October the Division ceased to be under the control of the Wehrmachtfuhrungstab, and it appears to have been reconstituted in the Balkans as a normal army formation under the OKH. The Lehrregiment KURFUERST, of course, is unaffected by the change. Though the Division is no longer of primary C.E. interest, it must be remembered that it probably still contains a number of Auslandsdeutsche and Volksdeutsche who have been selected as suitable agents for future use. Some of them will probably be transferred to S. ORZENY's new formation, but others will remain and their treatment on capture needs consideration both for their potential danger to security and the information they may possess.

E. Stay-behind plans in the West.

In addition to the projects of S. ORZENY which have been discussed in paragraph C, there is every reason to expect that as the Allies advance across German territory, the ex-Abwehr organization of KdMs, Kommandos and Trupps will continue to organize a stay-behind system of agents reporting to them across the lines by W/T and other means. So long as organized military resistance continues, this plan offers a greater chance of success than it did in occupied territory, since suitable and resolute agents will be less difficult to find and easier to camouflage.

The evidence suggests that such net-works are being laid thickly and will extend deep behind the German frontier. Amateur as well as Service W/T operators may well have been recruited for this work and officers acquainted with local conditions are being called in to advise and help with recruitment.

As long as the front remains fairly static, line-crossing both for local reconnaissance purposes and for short-term political missions, may be expected to continue, though as far as is known there is little evidence available for German plans to do this when the Allies have advanced further into Germany. At the moment, suitable recruits for this purpose may be found amongst disaffected Dutchmen, Belgians, Frenchmen and Luxembourgers. Later on, such persons will be of less use for short-term missions though some of them may well still be employed under the guise of escaping labour conscripts and refugees.

F. Plans for Underground Resistance after Defeat.

There is not yet sufficient real evidence to make possible a coherent account of German plans for continuing the struggle after military defeat. The plans themselves may well be still undetermined. Equally, it is impossible to say which, if any part of the RSH will take the lead in directing them, though such names as S. ORZENY's suggest themselves. It may well be that amongst the still mainly anonymous members of Amt III, leaders may have been selected for their anonymity and their detailed knowledge of the national life of Germany. The most likely account so far has been that of the Feuerfergruppe organization mentioned in a previous report, but our knowledge of it includes no details of its relations, if any, to the RSH. Meanwhile, reports from neutral countries must be regarded with suspicion,

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for while there is no doubt that plans for a determined resistance are really in hand, it must be supposed that the Nazis hope to increase their following by terror propaganda, aimed at frightening into passivity, if not indeed into anti-Allied action the mass of Germans who will soon find themselves in Allied-occupied Germany

6th December 1944.